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Abstract—A large body of research has been accomplished on
prevention and detection of malicious events, attacks, threats, or
botnets. However, there is a lack of automatic and sophisticated
methods for investigating malicious events/users, understanding
the root cause of attacks, and discovering what is really hap-
pening before an attack. In this paper, we propose an attack
model discovery approach for investigating and mining malicious
authentication events across user accounts. The approach is based
on process mining techniques on event logs reaching attacks in
order to extract the behavior of malicious users. The evaluation
is performed on a publicly large dataset, where we extract models
of the behavior of malicious users via authentication events. The
results are useful for security experts in order to improve defense
tools by making them robust and develop attack simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cybersecurity, there are globally three concepts to en-
hance the network security: prevention, detection, and in-
vestigation. In prevention, the goal is to reduce attacks by
discovering vulnerable nodes in the network [15], [26]. In
detection, the goal is to analyze network data and event
patterns, detect anomalies and threats using intrusion detection
tools such as Snort [21], [6] and Bro [19]. In investigation, the
goal is to discover the attack process, path, and find additional
compromised machines or users. Most existing works focus
on the prevention, and detection [4]. For instance, in the
prevention domain, the works are based on Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) [22], or a combination between Network
Functions Virtualization (NFV) and SDN [14]. In the detection
domain, the works can be rule-based (or signature based)
detection [7], [8] or machine learning-based techniques [9],
[13], [20]. However, the works for investigating and under-
standing attacks are not well-developed due to the following
reasons [4]: first, there is a lack of network or log data in terms
of quantity and quality. The data used in research is poor in
attacks and generated from a simulation that does not reflect
the reality compared to the existing logs in companies. In
fact, the existing hundred of megabytes or gigabytes of public
network data are not enough compared to the real environment
logging of gigabytes of logs per day [16]. Second, there is a
lack of labeling data highlighting alerts and attacks. Without
attacks, the analysts or researchers cannot provide tools for
investigation that go back to the source of an attack [4].
In this paper, we focus on the investigation of attacks which
is a challenging task. The problem of investigation is related
to the problem of understanding and discovering automatically
the process of attacks from a huge amount of event logs such
as authentication events. Given a set of authentication event
logs containing events reaching to an attack, the problem is to
analyze each authentication user and events triggering an alert.
Instead of analyzing the authentication events, manually, the
objective is to propose an automatic tool extracting a model
of attacks, and highlight the process of attacks when the user
authenticate in the system.
In this paper, we propose an investigation tool based on
process mining approach by discovering a process model of
attacks highlighting the different steps of attacks. Process
mining stands for techniques to analyze the event steps in
log data. Process mining is based on the convergence of
process modeling and data mining. It mines and extracts the
process models from business event logs. Analysis of these
event logs can detect bottlenecks in workflow and detect issues
with conformance [24]. Our method allows us to investigate
attacks by discovering their root cause and extract knowledge
from them. The solution provides a high-level of attacks from
authentication events using visualization easier. The results
show that the behavior process model of each malicious
user or set of malicious users help the security experts for
investigation by going back to the source of an attack and
its history. The investigation allows to upskill the security
experts, extract insights for improving the existent tools, and
implement more sophisticated defense tools.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Definition 1 (Authentication event): An authentication event
e is defined as a vector e = < t, su, du, sc, dc, at, lt, ao, sf >,
where it represents the value of the event attributes
event_attribute: time, source user, destination user, source
computer, destination computer, authentication type, logon
type, authentication orientation, success/failure, respectively.
The authentication event logs AUTH = {e1, ..., en} is the
ordered set of authentication events. Table I shows an example
of authentication event logs.
t SU DU SC DC AT LT AO SF
145015 U1723@C1759 U1723@C1759 C17693 C1759 NTLM Network LogOn Fail
150885 U620@DOM1 U620@DOM1 C17693 C1003 NTLM Network LogOn Success
TABLE I: Example of authentication event logs
Definition 2 (Malicious event): A Malicious event
e_malicious is an authentication event e_malicious ∈
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Investigating manually is a hard task [12], [4]. The inves-
tigation can be the analysis of users and malicious events
reaching an attack. Given a set of authentication event logs
and event logs of attacks, the problem is to mine each user
and event reaching an attack which triggering an alert. Thus,
we ask the following questions:
• How to investigate a huge amount of events from multi-
ples users reaching an attack and triggering an attack?
• How to extract the common behavior of attacks or sus-
picious behavior?
• How to represent the process of attacks and behavioral
model in a simple way?
• How to discover the common root cause of attacks?
III. RELATED WORK
In [3], the authors considered different types of discovery
approaches of extracting structures from log files for security
auditing. They focus on the business layer of the enterprise
architecture meta-model and assume well-structured and se-
mantically well-defined logs. In [2], the same authors focused
on conformance checking by reporting a case study in the
financial sector for the auditing of relevant security require-
ments. In [18], the authors proposed graph-based techniques to
learn attack strategies from intrusion alerts. They represented
an attack strategy as a graph of attacks with constraints on the
attack attributes and the temporal order among these attacks.
In [4], this work is close to our problem which consist in
analyzing the behavior of suspicious users. They proposed a
knowledge discovery approach for mining malicious authen-
tication events. Their approach is based on graph modeling
and analysis techniques. In [12], the authors proposed a graph
mining-based approach for analyzing port scans from darknet.
In [27], the authors used sequence pattern mining algorithm
for mining the user behavior on operation and maintenance
data. However, the sequence mining algorithms discover a
huge amount of patterns, which are not easy to analyze [17].
In [23], the authors proposed a data mining-based method for
investigation. The method is designed for finding patterns of
cyber attacks happened during a period.
The originality of our approach compared to the related
works is: first, it targets explicitly attack investigation problem
from authentication event logs data. Second, it relies on a
completely automatic data mining approach that both finds
malicious user behavior and presents explicitly what happens
frequently in each step of an attack. It discovers a common
process of attacks. Third, we use low-level data, i.e. authen-
tication event logs reaching an attack (instead of alerts used
in [18]).
IV. MINING ATTACKS APPROACH FOR INVESTIGATION
Our goal is to track and profile users involved in malicious
events. In addition, we want to establish causal relationships
among authentication events to build behavior users activities.
We propose a multi-steps approach based on a process mining
algorithm for tracking the behavior of a user through time.
The investigation process is detailed as follows.
A. Filtering authentication events
Given authentication event logs AUTH . The goal of this
step is to filter the AUTH according to the source users of
malicious events. The authentication event logs can be filtered
to focus on events having malicious source users triggering an
alert. The output of the filtering step is a set of authentication
event logs related to each source user which reach malicious
events. We define TraceSUi as set of authentication events
highlighting the traces of a source user SUi: TraceSUi =
{e|∀e ∈ AUTH, ∃e = e_malicious}. TraceSUi is sorted
on increasing time in order of events, as well as in AUTH .
TraceSUi describing the history of events related to SUi.
B. Authentication events transformation and representation
After the selection of source user with their events which
reach a malicious event, dependencies among events are built.
The dependencies are based on each source user and event time
to identify successive events. Thus, the events are grouped
based on users and the set of authentication events into a
sequence of events.
Definition 3 (Authentication events sequence): Let
TraceSUi be the set of all events of SUi. We denote
SSUi(TraceSUi , Tstart, Tend), the sequence of SUi between
the starting time Tstart and the ending time Tend, where
Tstart < Tend. SSUi is thus a list of authentication events
ordered by time: SSUi =< (e1, e1.t), . . . , (en.t), . . . >, where
ei ∈ TraceSUi , Tstart ≥ ei.t ≤ Tend such that ei+1.t > ei.t.
Figure 1 shows an example of an authentication events
















Fig. 1: Authentication events sequence
This sequence representation allows to characterize the
total order of events of a specific user. SSU =
{SSU1 , SSU2 , ..., SSUl}, where l is the number of source users
used having malicious events.
The event sequence allows to characterize causal relations
between two successive authentication events of a user.
C. Constructing a sequence of changes
In practice, the length of authentication event sequences
can be very long, and can reach up to a million of events
over time. In addition, the events may be redundant in a
sequence most of the time and analyzing and mining such
sequences is very complex. To characterize causal relations
between two successive events in a sequence, we introduce
the notion of the behavior change sequence as an intuitive
sequence representation for successive changes in a user events
sequence.
The task of behavior change is then to identify a shift
in the authentication state. The goal of this step is to de-
tect intrinsic changes of event attributes that are not neces-
sarily directly discovered and that are co-occurred together
with other types of events, and eventually perturbations. The
changes can be performed in the following attributes of
an event: source/destination user, source/destination machine,
authentication/logon type, authentication orientation, and suc-
cess/failure.
A sequence of changes is a sequence describing the changes
between each successive authentication event of a user. In
another way, a sequence of changes is a total order set of
event changes between two successive events. Formally, a
sequence of changes SC of a source user is a triplet (C,≤, β)
where C is a set of changes resulting from the function
β, C ∈ event_attribute, ≤ is a total order relation on C
i.e., x ≤ y or y ≤ x for all x, y ∈ C. β is a function
that computes the difference between each successive events
(ei, ti) → (ei+1, ti+1), it returns C, the set of attributes that
differ between them.
The difference of two successive events ei and ei+1 denoted
by ei 	 ei+1 is the difference operation of two arrays of their





of the attributes [c1, c2, ..., cn] and [c1, c2, ..., cn], where ci,
c′i ∈ C, and n ≤ |C|, is the difference between si and s′i.
Whether, si is different from s′i, then we return the attributes
ci, empty, otherwise. The advantage of getting the variations of
events based on event attributes allows to highlight the changes
between events. With this propriety, we can distinguish be-
tween the event states.
Example 4.1: Let consider the user event sequence in Fig. 1,
the sequence of changes of U1033 is: ({source computer,
destination computer, authentication type} → {destination
computer, authentication type}). The sequence of changes of
U103 is: ({∅} → {destination computer}).
A trace is a sequence of authentication events of a source
user when connecting to enterprise servers. The traces de-
scribe what steps of activities were executed for that user
or a set of users. The changes could be frequent/infrequent,
successive/not-successive, and periodic/no-periodic. Mining
and extracting such characteristics of patterns and models of
changes from malicious user event sequences is a challenge.
D. Mining a set of sequences of changes
The goal of process mining is to derive a model capable
of explaining all activities registered in a set of logs. The
discovered model by mining logs can be used to design
a detailed process schema supporting forthcoming improve-
ment, detecting suspicious behavior [1], conformance check-
ing [1], [2] or to describe its actual behavior [25]. The goal
of process mining is to analyze logs data and summarize it
into useful information for making decisions. In our problem,
the process mining technique allows us to analyze logs data
and summarize it into useful information for making decisions.
The advantage of the process mining algorithm is to: 1) save
time for investigation 2) have a global overview of paths
reaching the attacks 3) extract and improve the security expert
knowledge
There are basically three viewpoints for process mining:
• Process or activity viewpoints (How?). It allows to focus
on the control flow of the entire activity by showing the
steps in a model. The events order are shown using Petri
nets or event driven process chains.
• Organizational viewpoints (Who?). It allows to analyze
the originator of the event. It shows that which person is
involved in a process and how the people are linked.
• Event properties viewpoints (What?). It characterized the
event properties in the process or by the originators of
the event.
α-algorithm is one of the first process mining algorithm
that discovers workflow nets. It outputs a Petri net from logs.
Petri nets are among the best investigated process modeling
language allowing for the modeling of stepwise processes
or activities that include choice, iteration, and concurrent
execution.
Fig. 2: An example of a Petri net using α-algorithm of the
following users traces: U1: <abcd>, U2: <acbd>, U3: <ef>.
The discovering process using α-algorithm consist in 3
phases: • pre-processing: which consists of inferring relations
between the events. • processing: which consists of executing
the α-algorithm. • post-processing: modeling the outputs into
graph-based model such as Petri net model. In our case we use
α-algorithm for discovering a model of attacks from authenti-
cation event logs. The utility of α-algorithm for investigating
authentication logs achieving an attacks is to: • mine event
logs by discovering a workflow model of attacks. • establish
the ordering between the transitions of the workflow model.
• extract the following relations:
− direct succession ci > cj where we see in log sub-traces
< ...cicj ... >
− causality ci → cj ⇐⇒ ci > cj∧cj 6> ci. It means if there
is a sequence trace < ...cicj ... > and no a sequence trace
< ...cjci... >.
− parallel ci||cj ⇐⇒ ci > cj ∧ cj > ci. It means there are
sequences of traces < ...cicj ... > and < ...cjci... >
− unrelated ci 6= cj ⇐⇒ ci 6> cj ∧ cj 6> ci. It means there
are no sequence traces < ...cicj ... > nor < ...cjci... >.
Let us consider workflow log for the following users: U1:
<abcd>, U2: <acbd>, U3: <ef>. Figure 2 shows α-algorithm






























Fig. 3: Process of attacks of all malicious users triggering alerts.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Dataset description
For the experiments, we use a public comprehensive dataset
provided by the Los Alamos National Laboratory 1 [11], [10].
Its content was collected over a period of 58 consecutive days
and is comprised of 1.05 billion authentication events from
multiple sources, such as individual computers, servers, and
Active Directory servers running the Microsoft Windows oper-
ating system. The malicious events were true events produced
by realistic emulation of authorized attackers on the network;
hence it’s an advantage to validate scientific experimentation.
There are labeled malicious events for 104 of the 12425 total
users.
B. Setup
Our setup consists of a Linux operating system (Ubuntu
16.04) with 4 CPUs and 8 GB of memory. Our solution
have been implemented using the Python3 and pm4py2[5] for
process mining framework.
C. Results
Fig. 4 shows a process of an attack performed by a user.
The green circle node represents the beginning of the Petri
net and the orange one represents its end. The rectangle node
represents the changes in a user event sequence in each step.
The rectangle node before the end node represents the last
movement of an attacker before the triggering of an alert. We
see that there are 4 changes in event attributes reaching the
attack. Different scenarios of attacks have been performed:
The attacker changes the destination computer, authentication
type, and authentication orientation. The attacker changes the
source computer, or the whole event attributes. We notice
that the attack is characterized by a frequent change of event








Fig. 4: Process of an attack of a malicious user.
users. It shows different paths of strategies to reach an attack.
The paths of attacks can be containing one or more co-
changes in authentication events and one or more changes in
a path. The co-change can be source computer, destination
computer, authentication type, authentication orientation. This
model allows to security experts to investigate the path attacks
model from authentication events.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a process mining-based approach
for investigating and tracking malicious activities from au-
thentication events. The use of process mining allows us
to construct a model based on ordering relations amongst
malicious authentication activities. The advanced relations
model for causal dependency and concurrency are discovered
from authentication event logs. The discovered models can be
used for developing and improving defense systems against
malicious authentication events. Our future plan consists in
use of the discovered models of attacks on the detection tool.
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